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Abstract:
This paper analyses the interrelationship between internal and external security discourses in the 
field of European Union's neighbourhood policy. The European Union can be observed to actively 
use security concepts developed in the internal policy-field of Justice and Home Affairs as guiding 
principles of its foreign policy.  This development can be traced at least to the beginning of the 
enlargement process in the turn of the 1990s. The paper firstly examines how those discourses 
infuse the new domain of neighbourhood policy that starts  to take shape in the early 2000s.  It 
concludes  that  especially  since  the  European  Security  Strategy  (2003)  started  to  talk  of  the 
neighbourhood as a security issue, the policy can be considered to have become an inherent part of 
the Union's security priorities.
Secondly, the paper examines from a theoretical point of view the role of ideas for institutional 
identity-building.  Using the empirical  analysis  of the neighbourhood discourses as its departure 
point, the paper considers what this particular type of discourse can tell about the political entity 
that has emitted it. The research thus rejects the rationalist assumption of separable structure and 
agency. Instead it subscribes to the discursive institutionalist theory according to which institutions 
themselves are ideational structures that cannot be treated separately from actors who constitute 
them. Building its argument on the theses of critical security studies, the work concludes that by 
conceptualising  the  neighbourhood  in  terms  of  security  threat  the  Union  constructs  itself  as  a 
political community with societal accountability.
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Introduction
The political system governing an increasingly wide field of European politics, the European Union 
(EU),  has  proved  a  difficult  subject  for  political  theory.  In  its  present  form it  seems  to  defy 
definitions since it cannot be unambiguously conceptualized as either an international organization 
or as a state in the traditional understanding. Accordingly, a typical way of conceptualizing the EU 
is  to  describe  it  as  being  one  of  its  kind,  a  sui  generis.  This  conceptualization  is,  however, 
unsatisfactory if one wants to compare the EU with other known forms of political organization and 
to learn more about its behaviour. Governance theories of the EU have addressed this shortcoming 
by analysing the EU in terms of political community (Hix 1994, 2005). Their problem is however, 
that while elaborately describing the composition of the Union's decision-making structure they do 
not say much about the political nature of the system. Social constructivist approaches to European 
integration have, for their part, thoroughly addressed the issue of European political identity and its 
constructed nature (Christiansen et al. 2001). What seems to be missing in these approaches as well, 
however, is an effort to discuss the implications of the observed identity-building patterns to the 
definition of the EU as a political community.
This paper tries to grasp something of the EU's nature by looking at the way it addresses its 
neighbourhood. This will be done by combining explanations from the discursive institutionalist 
theory and from the critical approaches to security studies. The European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) provides a particularly fruitful ground for analysis because it is an original creation of the 
EU and differs significantly from the traditional modes associated with foreign policy activity. The 
way in which the Union formulates this policy can thus be taken as a unique manifestation of the 
role the Union has envisaged for itself both in relation to the neighbouring countries and in relation 
to its constituency. In principle any features of the discourse produced by the EU in this context can 
be  taken as  examples  of  how it  wants  to  portray itself.  In  the specific  case  of  the ENP,  as  is 
demonstrated  in  the  empirical  part,  the  most  prominent  discourse  concerns  issues  of  security. 
Indeed, especially in the aftermath of the 2004 Eastern enlargement and since the broadening of the 
Union's internal security agenda through the Hague Programme (also in 2004), the policies carried 
out  in  the  neighbourhood  have  become  increasingly  linked  with  concerns  about  security  and 
stability. This observation, however, calls for a few reserves. Despite a focus on security, the paper 
does  not  subscribe  to  the  neo-realist  claim  according  to  which  threats  and  their  sources  are 
objectively generated and external to the subjects conceptualizing them (Glarbo 2001). At the same 
time it does by no means deny the EU's present geopolitical situation in which it is surrounded both 
to  the  east  and  to  the  south  by  countries  easily  prone  to  either  internal  or  external  conflict. 
Nonetheless,  this  paper  maintains  that  a  geopolitical  situation  cannot  in  itself  be  expected  to 
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translate into an automatised political response. To the contrary, it perceives any approach adopted 
by the EU not as automatic or fortuitous but as based in rational calculation of the situation in 
question. However, the rationality of the EU is not believed to be based on any universal grounds. 
Instead, this paper argues, that it reveals the internal logic of the Union thus being a telling example 
of the way it identifies itself. For this reason the empirical analysis of the neighbourhood documents 
plays a crucial role and is placed in the first part of the paper.
By looking at policy documents, the paper will demonstrate that the discourse used by the 
Union can reveal a lot in terms of the Union's political identity. The study proceeds in two parts. In 
the  first  part,  the  paper  will  focus  on  discerning  the  dominant  discourse  emerging  from  the 
documents. Concretely, it will study how the Union conceptualizes its neighbourhood. It will show 
that in its way of addressing the neighbourhood the EU goes further than a traditional international 
organization because it  formulates a  cause for its  action in terms of a  common purpose.  More 
precisely, the whole policy is justified through the pursuit of internal security. The second part will 
discuss the implications of such conceptualization for the identity of the European Union. The paper 
presents two main claims. Firstly it argues that the EU constructs itself as an independent political 
community. Evidence for this argument are several. They include, firstly, the Union's ambition to 
formulate  a  specific  policy  domain  distinct  from  the  more  traditional  type  of  foreign  policy 
practised by states. Secondly, the Union's way of addressing the neighbourhood through security 
discourse shows its willingness to assert itself on the international arena. And thirdly, the way in 
which the Union has decided to use its internal security agenda as a motivating factor for external 
relations gives grounds to argue that it attempts to surpass the member states and to gain legitimacy 
directly from its citizens. The second analytical claim of the paper consists in saying that the EU 
constructs its political identity on a societal basis. A novel observation is the fact that the discourse 
legitimating  the  neighbourhood  policy  actually  relies  on  threat  images  targeted  at  the  level  of 
societies. The way in which citizens' interests, and not those of the member states', are placed at the 
centre of the Union's political identity constitute a strong evidence in  proving this point.  
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Part I
The European Neighbourhood Policy and the policy documents
European  Union's  policies  addressing  the  neighbourhood  can  in  general  terms  be  classified  as 
belonging to the Union's foreign policies. The distinction between foreign policies of the Union and 
other related policies is, however, ambiguous as is the distribution of powers and responsibilities in 
the domain.  Due to its  incremental  development throughout the integration history,  the field of 
foreign policy-making has not been explicitly codified to the same extent as most other EU policy 
fields. EU foreign policy actually developed for a long time through informal cooperation before 
gaining treaty status,  and relied more on shared understanding than legally binding rules.  As a 
consequence, the institutionalization of foreign policy in European integration was mainly achieved 
through the daily work of officials working in the field instead of high-level inter-state bargaining 
(Smith  2001).  Although  this  feature  of  the  EU  foreign  policy  practice  has  now  significantly 
diminished, member state governments still do not entirely control the domain and the Brussels 
bureaucracy continues to play a central role.
Indeed, even with increased codification between 1993-19991, and the introduction of the 
new Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar, the foreign policy of the EU still continued to be a 
mix of intergovernmental and community approach with a complex division of competencies. For 
instance, most agreements with third parties were still mixed agreements covering policy areas that 
fell under both the EC and the member states' competencies (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 
104).  The pillar structure was eventually abandoned on December 1st 2009 with the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon. The most significant innovation of the Treaty of Lisbon from the point of 
view of foreign policy-making was the creation of the position of the new 'High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy'. The purpose of this position is to achieve greater 
coherence  across  the  whole  domain  of  external  relations  and  to  overcome  institutional 
fragmentation. Most essentially, the High Representative, assisted by the European External Action 
Service, is expected to streamline the EU external policies by bringing together all those involved in 
foreign  affairs2 (Dagand 2008:  5-9).  During the period under  study (late  1990s to  present)  the 
European Council,  the Council and the European Commission were all actively involved in the 
shaping of the Union's external relations making it sometimes difficult to trace the origins of the 
new ideas brought to the policy field. Thus the paper analyses the statements made by these actors 
as belonging to the same general EU external relations discourse.
1 Foreign policy only first gained treaty status with the 1986 Single European Act. The Treaty on European Union 
(1993) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1998) subsequently consolidated the institutional basis of foreign policy 
cooperation of the EU. 
2 The External Action Service hosts officials from the Council, the Commission and the diplomatic services of 
Member States. 
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The institutional basis of cooperation in the field of neighbourhood policies
The  somewhat  nebulous  development  of  the  European  Union's  foreign  policy  structure  also 
influences the way the policies are formulated towards third countries closest to the Union. The 
European Neighbourhood Policy is a prime example of the mixing up of both internal and external 
policy objectives as well as internal and external policy tools. The ENP was first formally initiated 
in  2003 through the Commission Communication on Wider  Europe which laid  down the basic 
principles behind the policy and was later developed with a strategy paper in 20043. It has since 
been the main framework through which the Union has organised its relations with its immediate 
neighbours. Officially, the policy's objective is to provide for a deeper political relationship and 
economic  integration  with  the  partner  countries  without  offering  them  the  prospect  of  full 
membership (COM 2003a).
Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreements  (PCAs)  establish  the  legal  and  institutional 
framework for bilateral relations between the EU and the partner countries. Based on a common 
structure they address a broad range of issues covering political and economic reforms, co-operation 
in the area of justice, liberty and security, infrastructure networks and people-to-people contacts. In 
practice,  the  main  implementation  instruments  of  the  ENP are  the  Action  Plans  that  aim  at 
explaining what the PCA commitments consist of, and how they should be complied with (Hillion 
2005). Action Plans are political instruments used for listing reforms and steering relations between 
the EU and its neighbours in all areas of cooperation and are formally agreed upon in cooperation 
between the EU and each partner country. The advancement of the ENP policies is reviewed by the 
Commission through ENP progress reports that offer both a general as well  as country specific 
reports4.
The set up of the neighbourhood policy as well as the tools used for its implementation have 
to a large extent been derived from existing EU policies and in particular from the experiences of 
the Eastern enlargement (Kelley 2006; Gebhard 2007; Sasse 2008). Indeed at its initiation, the ENP 
mainly complemented rather  than superseded the existing bilateral  Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements that were concluded in the late 1990s with the CIS countries. As a consequence, the 
relations with the neighbours were developed mainly in the domain of the former first pillar and 
remained largely a contractual type of foreign policy instead of developing into a full-fledged CFSP 
3 The policy is currently directed towards 16 neighbouring states (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus (observer), 
Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya (observer), Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, 
Tunisia and Ukraine). Russia, despite being the EU's largest neighbour is not currently involved in the ENP actions 
but has a specific status as a strategic partner. (Commission's web page on ENP: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm; last consulted 16.11.2010)
4 Progress reports have been issued approximately once a year since December 2006 (the following ones being issued 
in April 2008, April 2009 and May 2010).
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action.  The  policy  was  managed  through  the  European  Commission's  Directorate-General  for 
External Relations. To overcome what was perceived as a lack of political significance, attempts 
were made to elevate the ENP to a higher political awareness and relevance. These initiatives have 
included the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean as well as the Eastern Partnership initiative 
in 2008. 
Similarly to the foreign policy field in general, the status of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy was supposed to change following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. With the new 
treaty,  issues  of  the  Commission  Directorate-General  for  External  Relations  were  due  to  be 
transferred  under  the  authority  of  the  new  post  of  the  High  Representative.  The  European 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso moved, however, the European Neighbourhood Policy 
from the External Relations to the Enlargement portfolio thus keeping it within the Commission. As 
a consequence, the ENP has to date remained under the competence of the Commission. Barroso's 
decision has been particularly deplored for the problems it poses to the much needed combination 
of supranational with intergovernmental instruments in the ENP (Misteli 2009). It serves, however, 
as an interesting indication of the way the Union sees its role in relation to the policy field.
How the neighbourhood documents conceptualize the policy
The content of the European Neighbourhood Policy has been expressed through a number of policy 
documents  officially  starting  from the  Commission  Communication  on  Wider  Europe  in  2003. 
However, since the enlargement process lasted over a decade (from 1993 to 2004), one could have 
expected some sort of analysis about the its external implications. Quite evidently, the process was 
about to extend the frontiers of the Union, and border it in the east with a set of new countries. As a 
matter of fact, documents preceding the actual formulation of the neighbourhood policy can give 
some  indications  about  what  the  Union  perceived  as  essential  in  its  relationship  with  the 
neighbours. For example the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council (October 
1999) that set down the "milestones" for a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice also contained a 
section  on  external  action.  In  that  document  external  relations  of  the  Union,  including  the 
neighbourhood policies,  are  subjected to the goal  of  building an area of  freedom, security and 
justice. The document states that: "Justice and Home Affairs concerns must be integrated in the 
definition and implementation of other Union policies and activities" (European Council  1999). 
However,  the  European  Council  does  not  develop  a  more  elaborate  vision  on  the  role  of  the 
neighbours at this stage. In general terms though, and despite the self-evident implications that the 
enlargement was about to bring, EU documents did not address the question of a neighbourhood 
policy comprehensively during the enlargement negotiations. 
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The  idea  of  a  neighbourhood  policy  was  first  approved  by  the  Copenhagen  European 
Council in December 2002. The Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, that also marked 
the  successful  conclusion  of  the  enlargement  negotiations,  illustrate  well  the  neighbourhood 
discourse on the eve of enlargement. They duly acknowledge the new geographical situation of the 
Union but do not yet formulate any advanced plan for the new relationship. They merely assert that 
the enlargement presents an "important opportunity to take forward relations with neighbouring 
countries based on shared political and economic values" (European Council 2002: 6). Actually, the 
European Council  appears  less  than  visionary when it  promises  to  encourage  and support  "the 
further development of cross-border and regional cooperation inter alia through enhancing transport 
infrastructure, including appropriate instruments, with and among neighbouring countries in order 
to develop the regions' potential to the full." (ibid: 7). The substance of the proposed cooperation 
tools is not further explained. So the neighbourhood in the Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions 
appears merely an area which existence is recognized but for which no plan is yet  developed5. 
Indeed the  European Council  expresses  its  interest  in  a  proposal  that  the  Commission and the 
Council Secretary-General / High Representative are expected to formulate.
The  relative  insignificance  of  the  neighbourhood at  the  end of  the  enlargement  process 
would not necessarily be so surprising if it wasn't for the brusque change of tone that happened in 
subsequent EU discourse. As implied by the Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions, the Commission 
and  the  High  Representative  were  expected  to  present  a  more  elaborate  plan  for  a  new 
neighbourhood policy. The planning of the policy had actually already started with a joint letter on 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy on Wider Europe given by the High Representative Javier 
Solana and the Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten in August 2002. Already at this 
stage it is noteworthy that relations with the neighbours were essentially conceptualized in terms of 
security. Indeed, as Cremona and Hillion (2006: 4) note, the security dimension of the ENP was not 
merely an incidental component but was, since the beginning of the planning process, fundamental 
to the policy as a whole.
The subsequent documents and texts dealing with the EU's neighbourhood reveal the full 
scale of the security concerns associated with the new neighbours6. The tone is set by the launching 
document of the European Neighbourhood Policy Wider Europe A Neighbourhood which starts by 
5 The document does, however, outline the geographical scope of the new neighbourhood by mentioning Russia, 
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Mediterranean countries as the future partners of "enhanced relations" (European 
Council 2002: 7).
6 In this paper I focus only on the documents that can be regarded as covering the policy field in its entirety and thus 
will not analyse country-specific Partnership and Cooperation / Association Agreements, Action Plans or Progress 
Reports.
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conceptualizing the neighbourhood as a challenge7 and by declaring that: "Over the coming decade 
and beyond, the Union's capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its 
citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours." 
(COM 2003a: 3). The EU shows itself as carrying a responsibility towards its citizens in terms of 
security and economic development and justifies the engagement in the neighbourhood precisely 
through this internal responsibility. It characterises the neighbours as all sharing a set of "challenges 
and opportunities" somewhat cryptically termed as "proximity, prosperity and poverty". What the 
document actually means is that the geographic proximity of the neighbouring countries increases 
the Union's concerns about the appropriate way of border management, and that the Union wants to 
enhance prosperity and decrease poverty in the hope that it would replace conflict with stability: 
"The EU must act to promote the regional and subregional cooperation and integration that are 
preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social 
divisions in our shared environment." (ibid.).  Indeed, as noted in the text, political instability and 
conflict can lead to negative effects that are not only domestic: "so long as conflicts persist there is a 
danger of spill over" (ibid: 9) both within the region and to the EU. The "new vision" and the "new 
offer" proposed by the policy paper maintain the EU-centric and security-conscious approach. The 
EU proposals are marked by two overarching assumptions. Firstly, the approach is based on the 
faith in favourable effects of economic integration8 realized through the harmonization of trading 
markets. And secondly it draws its inspiration from the Union's justice and home affairs policies 
that serve as a basis for formulating the "common security threats". As a whole, the first official EU 
document on the European Neighbourhood Policy can be described as relatively pragmatic and not 
overly value-laden. It does, however, clearly show that the EU sees its relations with the neighbours 
mainly in terms of security and threat containment.
It can be argued that the Commission Communication started a trend that subsequent EU 
statements  only  reinforced.  For  example,  the  European  Council  that  had  previously  mostly 
addressed the question of the neighbourhood through the more positive idea of avoiding dividing 
lines in Europe, formulated its new vision the Presidency Conclusions of Thessaloniki (June 2003): 
"[The neighbours'] stability and prosperity is inextricably linked to ours. To reinforce our shared 
values and promote our common interests, we have been developing new policies toward Wider 
Europe,  our  New  Neighbourhood."  (European  Council  2003a).  The  guidelines  for  the 
implementation  of  the  European Neighbourhood Instrument  (a  new financial  instrument  of  the 
policy) illustrate the matter further with a particularly articulate security discourse: 
7 The first chapter of the document is headlined: "Wider Europe: Accepting the Challenge" (COM 2003a: 3)
8 The document states that the long term goal of the policy is to achieve a level of integration between the EU and the 
neighbours that would resemble the Union's current relationship with the European Economic Area (ibid: 15).
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[...] [T]he new opportunities brought by enlargement will be accompanied 
by  new  challenges:  existing  differences  in  living  standards  across  the 
Union's borders with its neighbours may be accentuated as a result of faster 
growth  in  the  new  Member  States  than  in  their  external  neighbours; 
common challenges in fields such as the environment, public health, and the 
prevention of and fight against organised crime will have to be addressed; 
efficient and secure border management will be essential both to protect our 
shared borders and to facilitate legitimate trade and passage. (COM 2003b: 
4)
The Union's objective to contribute with the neighbourhood policy to increased mutual stability, 
security and prosperity has subsequently been reiterated on several occasions (see e.g. Council of 
the  European  Union  2004:  11).  The  most  significant  move  by  which  the  neighbourhood  was 
transferred  to  the  realm  of  security  happened,  however,  with  the  publishing  of  the  European 
Security Strategy (December 2003).
The European Security Strategy (ESS) is the first document that wrote out the EU's security 
priorities  in  a  coherent  and  comprehensive  way.  Drafted  (just  like  the  ENP)  by the  EU High 
Representative  Javier  Solana,  it  was  a  response  to  feelings  that  the  Union  needed  a  common 
expression of its ambitions in the field of security and defence policy. It was also seen as an opening 
for a new debate among the Member States about the Union's security identity (Berenskoetter 2005: 
73). From this perspective the document carries more weight than the more action-oriented policy 
documents. It is thus especially interesting to see how the document speaks of the neighbours and of 
the approach the Union should take towards them. After situating the Union in the contemporary 
global  security  context,  the  document  enumerates  five  key  threats:  terrorism,  proliferation  of 
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. Addressing those 
threats is then (quite predictably) advanced as the first of the Union's "strategic objectives". What is 
interesting, however, is that the second strategic objective formulated by the strategy is "building 
security in our neighbourhood" (European Council 2003b: 7)9. The priority of building security in 
the  neighbourhood is  quite  clearly defined  as  stemming from the  Union's  own security-related 
interests: 
It  is  in  the  European  interest  that  countries  on  our  borders  are  well-
governed. Neighbours who are engaged in a violent conflict,  weak states 
where  organised  crime  flourishes,  dysfunctional  societies  or  exploding 
population growth all pose problems for Europe. (ibid.)
The way in which the strategy associates the addressing of threats and the neighbourhood policy 
9 However, the ESS takes a rather large view of the neighbourhood area including for instance the Southern Caucasus 
which was not addressed by the actual ENP policy until a later stage. On the other hand, the strategy does not 
elaborate on the means of the potential "security building" in the neighbourhood.
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can lead to the conclusion that both are equally important for countering the key threats faced by the 
Union. Relations with the neighbourhood are thus firmly placed in the realm of security and defence 
policy.  Indeed, as has been paraphrased by Biscop, the Union can almost be heard thinking: "a 
stable neighbourhood is a necessity for our own security and promoting stability in our area is our 
duty, since we are the local actor with the means to do so" (2004: 19, emphasis in original). He thus 
proposes the application of the concept of regional security complexes to the European Union and 
its neighbours (especially those on the European continent) (ibid.). The possibilities of that theory 
will be observed in the next chapter.
After  the  European  Security  Strategy,  the  EU's  neighbourhood  policy  became  to  an 
increasing extent rooted in the security discourse. The European Commission's Strategy Paper for 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (April 2004) states that besides tackling the new geopolitical 
environment created by the enlargement, the ENP is also a response to the objectives set by the 
ESS. Moreover, it repeats the EU's "vision" of a ring of friendly neighbours that, if successful, "will 
bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and well being." (COM 
2004:  5)10.  In  addition,  the  Strategy  Paper  links  the  Union's  internal  security  agenda  and  the 
neighbourhood policy in a previously unprecedented way. Whereas the earlier ENP documents had 
only made brief allusions to the Justice and Home Affairs priorities of the Union11, the Strategy 
Paper uses the concept much more widely and to an extent to make it look as one of the policy's 
main sources of inspiration12. It appears for the first time in the chapter sketching the principles and 
scope of the new policy: "The ENP can also help the Union's objectives in the area of Justice and 
Home Affairs [...]" (COM 2004: 6). The association between the Union's internal security agenda 
and the neighbourhood policy is further spelled out when Justice and Home Affairs are presented as 
one  of  the  headlines  that  will  figure  in  the  country-specific  Action  Plans.  Without  hiding  its 
preference for firm action against illegal migration, human and drugs trafficking and terrorism, the 
EU presents the issues as "matters of common interest" (ibid.: 16-17). Finally, an extension of the 
Union's security agenda can be detected in the way in which the document speaks out the Union's 
commitment  to  a set  of values.  The document reminds that  these values13 are  "common to the 
10 The administrative language of the Commission also bears a military connotation when it conceptualizes the ENP 
officials as "Wider Europe Task Force" (COM 2003c; COM 2004: 2)
11 The Wider Europe communication only mentions the existing Justice and Home Affairs Action Plan for Ukraine as 
an example of an approach that could be taken (COM 2003a: 12). Similarly the ENPI guidelines also only mention 
Justice and Home Affairs in passing and as one of the many actions that could be part of the "Neighbourhood 
Programmes" proposed by the Commission. (COM 2003b: 8). The European Security Strategy does not link Justice 
and Home Affairs issues and the neighbourhood in any explicit way.
12 The term is mentioned six times (once as a headline) in 29 pages of text as opposed to one or zero times in earlier 
documents.
13 In this document they are listed as follows: respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights (COM 2004: 12).
11
Member States" and that the neighbours "have pledged adherence to fundamental human rights and 
freedoms,  through their  adherence to  a  number of multilateral  treaties  as well  as  through their 
bilateral agreements with the EU." (COM 2004: 12). The EU reminds the partner countries on two 
other occasion (in the same sub-chapter) about their commitment to these values and makes clear 
that their adoption is a condition for an improved relationship: "The level of the EU’s ambition in 
developing links with each partner through the ENP will  take into account the extent to which 
common values are effectively shared." (ibid.: 13). It almost seems that the Union which sees itself 
as a value community is fearful of partners that do not comply with its norms; an issue that will be 
further discussed in the next chapter.
The internal security priorities based on the Justice and Home Affairs agenda did not only 
enter with force the realm of the ENP. The connection was also made the other way around, i.e. 
documents outlining the Union's internal security policy started to show increased interest in the 
external dimension of this policy area. The EU had launched in November 2004 the so called Hague 
Programme, a five-year programme that outlined the agenda for strengthening the "area of freedom, 
security and justice"14. In October 2005 the programme was complemented by a new strategy from 
the  Commission  that  highlighted  the  interconnectedness  of  internal  and  external  security 
questions15. The document called  A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom,  
Security  and Justice concluded that  the  Union's  own policies  within  the  domain  had  "matured 
considerably", and for that reason it was necessary to also address the "external challenges" faced 
by the area16.  The strategy recognises that:  "External  policies  have a  crucial  role  in promoting 
security and stability." (COM 2005: 5). Besides the enlargement and pre-accession policy during 
which candidate countries must directly adopt EU legislation, the Union sees the Neighbourhood 
Policy as one of the main policy instruments by which it can achieve its goals of increased internal 
security.  Indeed justice, freedom and security are "significant components" of the Actions Plans 
agreed  with  the  neighbours.  Thus,  not  only  does  the  EU  securitize  its  policies  towards  the 
neighbourhood, it also extends its domestic security policies beyond its borders to the neighbours: 
"The main tenets of a strategy covering external aspects of the EU’s policy on freedom, security and 
justice are largely in place, notably as regards neighbouring countries which are the first natural 
partners for closer cooperation." (ibid.:  9).  Similarly,  in a 2006 document called  Europe in the  
World  –  Some  Practical  Proposals  for  Greater  Coherence,  Effectiveness  and  Visibility the 
14 Already initially drafted in the 1999 Tampere "milestones", see above.
15 Concern about the external dimension of internal security was not entirely new for the EU since it was already 
expressed at the European Council in Feira in 2000. However the Commission strategy in 2005 was the first 
document that took a more principled view of the issue by linking it to the Union's norm-based political objectives.
16 The challenges outlined by the document were the by now familiar ones of terrorism, organised crime, illegal 
immigration and weak states (COM 2005: 3-4).
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Commission  notes  that:  "Increasingly  the  EU’s  internal  policies  [...]  impact  on  international 
relationships and play a vital part in the EU’s external influence. Conversely, many of Europe’s 
internal policy goals depend on the effective use of external policies." (COM 2006a: 2).
So already the two first years (2003-2005) of the European Neighbourhood Policy showed 
that security-related concerns were one of the main motivating factors for the Union to pursue a 
closer relationship with the neighbours. The subsequent documents did not change this trend. In 
December 2006 the Commission published a communication on "Strengthening of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy" together with assessments of the partner countries' progress (i.e. progress 
reports).  Listing  both achievements  and things  to  improve,  the text  argues  for  the  necessity of 
strengthening the policy because: "[The problems faced by the neighbours] risk producing major 
spillovers  for  the  EU,  such  as  illegal  immigration,  unreliable  energy  supplies,  environmental 
degradation and terrorism." (COM 2006b: 2). These risks serve thus as an impetus for enhanced 
measures. In practice, however, the proposals made by the document remain remarkably moderate 
and focus on traditional "low-policy" EU methods (e.g. enhanced economic and trade relations, 
facilitation of mobility, people-to-people contacts, etc.). The Council, however, in its assessment of 
the Commission communication, defines the strategic aims and principles of the policy in much 
sharper terms: 
There is a clear geopolitical imperative to foster stability, the rule of law and 
human  rights,  better  governance  and  economic  modernization  in  our 
neighbourhood. This is critical to address our strategic objectives, to tackle 
the challenges we face and to reap the substantial benefits of closer political 
and  economic  ties.  [...]  Political  instability  and  weak governance  in  our 
neighbourhood could impact on the EU. At the same time, risks to Europe’s 
energy security, environmental threats and rising flows of illegal migration, 
to  name  but  a  few,  also  have  a  growing  influence  on  our  security  and 
prosperity. (Council of the European Union 2007: 2).
Indeed,  the Council  literally conceptualizes  the ENP as  a  security policy by stating that:  "The 
strengthened ENP is thus a security and prosperity policy for Europe's citizens." (ibid.: 3). 
Since  2006  the  production  of  general  framework  documents  regarding  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy has slowed down. The Council commented on the evolution of the policy in 
two conclusions (June 2007 and February 2008) and the Commission published its latest strategy 
paper  A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy in December 2007. In addition, the Commission 
has published yearly progress reports as well as working papers concerning some specific aspect of 
the policy17. The European Security Strategy was also reviewed in 2008 by the High Representative 
17 E.g. A paper on "Governance Facility" was published in February 2008 to explain the EU's priorities in the field of 
governance.
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Javier Solana. However, the proposals made in the review focused on the implementation side of 
the  strategy  thus  leaving  the  basic  principles  in  place.  The  document  actually  reiterated  the 
argument made five years earlier about the interconnectedness of prosperity and stability: "As the 
ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable 
development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there 
will be no sustainable peace." (Solana 2008: 8). None of the latest documents brought any essential 
new features  to  the  policy priorities  but  rather  confined  themselves  in  echoing  the  established 
discourse18. It seems thus that the policy had entered an implementation phase where the general 
framework and principles are more or less fixed and in which the focus is on lower-level practical 
work. Consequently, there is no reason to expect significant discursive changes.
The reason for the slowing down of the European Neighbourhood Policy can be at least 
partly  explained  by  a  change  in  the  Union's  general  approach  towards  the  neighbouring  area. 
Whereas the ENP was based on highly structured and demanding bilateral partnerships with each of 
the  neighbouring  countries,  the  Union has  lately  shifted  towards  a  more  regional  approach.  It 
launched  in  2007-2008  three  new  regional  initiatives:  the  Black  Sea  Synergy,  the  Eastern 
Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. It is not the place here to observe these initiatives 
in their detail nor to enter in the discussion of the political motivations behind them. It will suffice 
to note that while the new approaches undoubtedly sought to bring more political weight to a policy 
area dominated by technical Action Plans, they have also contributed to its fragmentation and to a 
certain  loss  of  salience.  Indeed,  there  is  a  risk  that  the  proliferation  of  initiatives  in  the 
neighbourhood area could divert focus away from existing priorities and weaken the EU's overall 
strategy. Some observers even suggest that the ENP will become entirely void of content (Mayhew 
and Hillion 2009: 28). Since 2008 the EU has not published any general policy papers about the 
ENP but has mainly produced country-specific strategy papers and progress reports.
The above account gives firm grounds to affirm that, in general terms, the policies towards 
neighbours have been marked by a strong security discourse at least since the publication of the 
European Security Strategy in 2003. One could even advance a claim that the Union's meta-goal for 
the whole region has become the consolidation of stability. This does naturally not mean that the 
neighbourhood policy (or other related policies dealing with neighbouring countries) would have 
been treated exclusively in terms of security. Indeed, the major part of the neighbourhood-related 
documents focused on outlining concrete  measures concerning diverse issues19.  In addition,  the 
18 The only minor change of tone can be noted in the Commission's strategy paper that is more attentive to the partner 
countries than before and thus points out that also the Union needs to make improvements: "Sustained effort is 
required to ensure that the offer made to ENP partner countries comes up to their expectations." (COM 2007: 11).
19 Issues dealt by the policy initiative included inter alia media freedom and freedom of expression; enhanced 
consultation on crisis management; enhanced co-operation in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and 
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documents repeatedly stress the Union's wish to avoid dividing lines in Europe and to engage in a 
mutually beneficial relationship. There is no reason to dismiss that side of the discourse as fake. 
Indeed, the concern of this paper is not to prove that one or the other discourse is more widely used 
and for that reason more "genuine" than the other. As established in this chapter, security is a highly 
visible and persistent feature of the Union's neighbourhood discourse. This observation alone is 
enough for this paper to move forward and to reflect on the question of what this discourse can tell 
about the Union as a political entity.
Part II
Neighbourhood policies offering an explanation about the EU
The  previous  part  outlined  the  discursive  evolution  of  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy 
documents. It showed how that discourse had come about and the ways in which it had evolved in a 
period of ten years (approximately from 1999 to 2008). The main findings concerned the notable 
rise of security rhetoric following the European Security Strategy (2003) and the increasing spill-
over  of  internal  security  concerns  into  the  foreign  policy  domain.  In  general  terms,  that  part 
established clearly the existence of a security discourse in the field of ENP. The purpose of this 
second part is to interpret the results of the empirical chapter. This part is interested to find out what 
does the discourse analysed in part one tell about the political entity that emits it. It will thus reflect 
on  the  question:  what  can  be  said  about  the  European  Union  in  the  light  of  the  existing  
neighbourhood  discourse? To  find  an  answer  to  this  question  I  will  focus  my  attention  on 
theoretical models of explanation concerning identity-building and the role of discourses.
However,  before  entering  the  analysis  proper,  I  will  briefly  explain  the  focus  of  this 
analytical chapter by pointing out the aspects in which it is not interested. The general aim of this 
part is theoretical in the sense that it tries to select and apply an adequate theoretical framework that 
would take into account both the interest in discourse as well as the strong presence of security 
concerns. Accordingly, it does not contain many of the features commonly present in ENP literature. 
Firstly,  this  part  is  not  meant  to  assess  the  appropriateness  or  the  fairness  of  the  European 
Neighbourhood Policy. In contrast with for instance Gebhard (2007) it does not evaluate the Union's 
"actorness"  in  the  field  of  neighbourhood  relations  and  does  not  offer  an  assessment  on  the 
successes or failures of the policy. By the same token, the paper also does not assess how suitable 
regional security; WTO accession; gradual removal of trade restrictions, improvement of the investment climate; tax 
reforms; preparing negotiations for a visa facilitation agreement; gradual legislative approximation and dialogue on 
employment issues. (For a more comprehensive list see country-specific Action Plans).
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the  policy  instruments  of  the  Neighbourhood  Policy  have  been  nor  does  it  give  any 
recommendations on how the policy could be improved or what should be done. Secondly,  the 
paper does not analyse the target countries' perception of the policy and does not take a stance on 
whether it has met their expectations20. Instead the focus is entirely on the European Union in the 
sense  that  discourses  produced  by  the  Union's  institutions  are  seen  as  representing  a  specific 
ideational construction that also influences the identity of the Union. I do not claim by any means 
that the discourses would not affect the target countries. However, their effect is seen as an external 
"side-effect" of the discursive process and thus are not the prime centre of interest of this research.
As implied by the negation of the normative and the practical implementation perspectives, 
the  descriptive  method  adopted  in  many  studies  concerning  this  specific  policy  field  is  not 
satisfactory  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper.  As  this  chapter  is  mostly  interested  in  questions 
concerning the political nature of the EU, or at least in the image that ENP discourses give about the 
EU as a political entity, it will have to search for an appropriate theoretical frame for its analysis. 
Below, I will first review a number of traditional integration theories and their updated variants 
before moving on to critical discourse theories that, in my view, present the most promising grounds 
for analysing discourse based identity-building.
Traditional integration theories and the political nature of the European Union
The so called traditional theories of European integration, i.e. the theories that were first formulated 
to analyse the specific phenomenon of European integration, approach the question of the political 
nature of the Union essentially in a similar way. The starting point for their analysis is that the EC / 
EU, at its base, is an international organization and that it is in constant evolution. Determining the 
emergence  of  the  Euro-polity  and  the  forces  driving  its  evolution  is  the  main  concern  of  the 
classical integration theories: neofunctionalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism. The prominent 
questions featured by these theories concern the distribution of power within the Union, the internal 
decision-making structures and governance in general terms. However the question concerning the 
definition of the nature of the European Union does not in general occupy a very central position in 
these  theories.  As a  consequence,  the  Union is  often  described  as  being  a  sui  generis type  of 
political structure meaning that it is one of its kind and thus not comparable to other existing or 
known types of political organization (Øhrgaard 1997). 
One reason for this situation can be found in the history of the integration process. Indeed, 
what we today observe as a relatively well established and to a certain extent consolidated political 
structure appeared more as an ongoing process to those such as Ernst B. Haas who in the late 1950s 
20 For an example of an analysis on the impact of the ENP see Wolczuk 2009.
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and  early  1960s  started  to  write  about  the  phenomenon  of  integration.  Thus  the  theory  most 
associated with his work, neofunctionalism, essentially focuses on describing the evolution patterns 
of the process rather than trying to define the end product at any given time. It's main goal is to find 
out  which actors  provide the main dynamics  that  further  integration (Schmitter  2004:  46).  The 
competing argument  of the neofunctionalist  theory's  main rival,  the liberal  intergovernmentalist 
approach, is based on an implicit recognition of the neofunctionalist logic of explanation. While 
arguing that strong states and influential national leaders are the drivers of integration instead of the 
supranational institutions favoured by the neofuctionalists, the liberal intergovernmentalist theory 
also focuses its attention on the process rather than the outcome. In doing so, it does not actually 
depart very much from the neofunctionalist perspective. Essentially, both these theories explain why 
states choose to empower the EU to perform certain tasks in specific areas. Although they present 
two competing reasons for the phenomenon, a society-centred and a state-centred one, both their 
explanations concern integration as a process but not the European Union as a political entity.
Since  the  late  1980s  which  saw a significant  increase  in  the  activities  of  the  European 
Community the theoretical approaches to European integration have also diversified substantially. 
Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch (2004: 98-99) point  out at  two broad strands supplementing the 
existing  traditional  theories.  The  empirically  driven  policy  analysis  focuses  on  studying  how 
problems are solved in different institutional contexts and has contributed to a better understanding 
of the workings of the EU's multi-level system. At the same time, however, it suffers from a lack of 
generalizability. The other strand, labelled the constitutional debate by Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-
Koch, is more concerned with the question of what a political entity such as the EU should look 
like. Accordingly, it consists mainly of normative accounts about the legitimate and effective form 
of governance for the EU polity. The new approach suggested by the same authors and variably 
called either multilevel governance or just governance aims to address the shortcomings of the older 
integration  theories.  Its  novelty  lies  in  the  way it  conceptualizes  the  EU  as  a  comprehensive 
institution in which individual member states are embedded in a larger political structure. However, 
the governance theory focuses mainly on the institutional rules governing the EU. Thus it is not 
particularly  interested  in  finding  out  what  are  the  effects  of  those  rules  on  the  identities  of 
institutional actors. As such, although providing some helpful insights into the competence sharing 
within the institutions, it does not give substantial help in trying to answer the question how can the 
current EU-polity be characterised? In the end, both the traditional and many of the newer theories 
of European integration still rely on the notion of the EU as a sui generis. They do not conceptualize 
it as identical or comparable to a state or a political community more in general thus depriving it 
from the insights of comparative politics.
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Discursive institutionalist theory and critical security studies
As  explained  above,  the  mainstream integration  theories  do  not  provide  satisfactory  tools  for 
analysing the phenomena observed in the empirical material of this paper. To reiterate, the first part 
showed that the use of the notion of security has significantly increased in context of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. This study is interested to analyse this observation by asking what can be 
said about the political entity that makes such a frequent use of that concept.
The first step in interpreting the EU's security discourse is contrasting the role of security 
discourses of the EU to that of other political entities. This departure point is, however, problematic 
for the traditional integration theories. Neofunctionalism and liberal inter-governmentalism perceive 
the EU as a specific type of polity, a sui generis. As a consequence, for them it does not make sense 
to compare it to other existing polities. This, in turn, makes comparative study impossible. This 
conundrum was addressed by Hix (1994;  2005) who was the first  to characterise  the EU as  a 
political  community in  its  own right  and  to  study it  with  the  means of  comparative  politics21. 
Conceptualizing the EU as a political community opens new paths of comparative analysis with 
other existing polities. One such approach is the institutionalist theory that focuses on describing 
and analysing the rules, norms, routines and other constrains that guide social behaviour. It seems 
indeed logical to study one of the world's most regulated political  systems in these terms. The 
theory,  however,  is not homogeneous and it is divided in diverse strands that all differ in their 
contention  about  the  ontological  basis  of  the  institutional  constraints.  Thus  the  rational-choice 
institutionalism  is  characterised  by  the  rationalist  assumptions  about  actors  who  pursue  their 
preferences following a ‘logic of calculation’; the historical institutionalism focuses on the ways in 
which a given set of institutions can influence or constrain the behaviour of the actors  following the 
‘logic of path-dependence’; and the sociological institutionalism concentrates on social agents who 
act  according  to  a  ‘logic  of  appropriateness’ within  the  institutions  (Pollack  2004).  They  all, 
however, share the common feature of separating agency and structure. As a consequence, they end 
up paying only limited attention to ideas and do not account fully for the role of identities for 
institution-building. 
The strand of institutionalist theory that refutes the separation of agency and structure is the 
discursive  institutionalist  approach.  Like  the  other  strands  of  the  institutionalist  theories  the 
discursive institutionalist theory is also interested in the internal composition, the development and 
the functioning of institutions. Its original contribution comes from the assertion that institutions are 
21 Hix's argument for seeing the EU as a suitable object of the institutionalist theories stems from the developments of 
the EC during the late 1980s when the community significantly developed the reach and the efficiency of its 
legislation (examples include the Single European Act and the Common Market programme). Rasmussen (2009 and 
Knudsen and Rasmussen 2008), however, claims that the notion of political community can even be applied to the 
case of the EU already much earlier.
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ideational structures that cannot be treated separately from actors who constitute them (Schmidt 
2008, 2010). For Schmidt institutions are "structures and constructs of meaning internal to agents" 
(2010:  1).  This approach wants  to  place ideas into their  meaning context  and to  treat  them as 
empirical subjects.  Ideas held by actors acting within institutions are in themselves the formative 
basis of institutions and should be studied in their own right. In short, the discursive institutionalist 
theory considers the study of institutional structures alone, without attention to the ideas of the 
actors constituting those institutions, as unsatisfactory and flawed. 
The method this approach proposes for recognizing and analysing ideas is to study them as a 
part  of  a  discourse.  For  Schmidt,  discourse  is  a  versatile  and  overarching  concept  that 
simultaneously indicates the ideas represented in the discourse and the interactive processes by 
which ideas are conveyed (2008: 309). Thus the discursive institutionalist  approach is not only 
interested in describing ideas in a given discourse but also in the presentation, deliberation, and 
legitimation of political ideas that constitute the essence of political action. Discourses convey ideas 
both within a policy sphere i.e. between different policy actors and towards the outside of the policy 
sphere i.e. to the general public22. Since this study is interested in answering the question what can 
be  said  about  the  European  Union  in  the  light  of  the  existing  neighbourhood  discourse? an 
approach that views discourses as the means of both expressing and of conveying ideas seems like a 
natural choice.
Naturally, this work is not the first one in the field of European integration to turn towards 
ideational explanations. A focus on ideas can be observed as an increasing trend both in the field of 
IR and in European integration. A thoroughly developed empirical research on the role of ideas in 
the process of integration can be found in Parsons (2003). He bases his argument on the statement 
that the whole integration process builds on the institutionalization of specific ideas (Parsons 2003: 
2). Moreover, his understanding of ideas implies that they can be empirically studied and that they 
all have a history that can be uncovered. The specificity of the EU, according to him, is the weight 
of the institutional structure and the impact of the ideas that manage to penetrate that structure. Thus 
he  argues  that  even  ideas  that  do  not  have  an  immediate  causal  impact  may develop  to  form 
constitutive norms for the whole community. As a consequence, ideas do not only cause actors to 
make certain choices but "the institutionalization of certain ideas gradually reconstructs the interests 
of powerful actors" (ibid: 6). Another empirical study that illustrates the importance of ideas in the 
EU context is Sedelmeier's (2005) work on the EU's eastern enlargement23. While using a different 
terminology  than  Parsons,  Sedelmeier  essentially  argues  that  a  constructed  collective  identity 
22 Schmidt calls the message-conveying discourse aimed towards the inside of the polity the "coordinative discourse" 
and the one aimed towards the outside the "communicative discourse" (2008: 310).
23 Schmidt (2008: 309) also mentions the study of Jabko (2006) on the role of ideas in European market integration.
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directs EU policy and that a number of specific ideas or "roles" (Sedelmeier 2005: 9) are at the basis 
of  that  collective  identity.  He  maintains  that  those  ideas  or  roles  emerge  in  specific  historical 
contexts. In addition, he notes that even the most influential ideas are not evenly distributed among 
decision-makers. To demonstrate his thesis he conducts a thorough analysis on the evolution the 
idea that "the EU has a responsibility towards the Central and Eastern European Countries". 
Inspired by the examples of Parsons and Sedelmeier and equipped with the tools of the 
discursive institutionalist approach, this work also focuses its attention on the role of ideas in one 
specific domain of EU policy-making, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy. The idea that is 
the central focus of analysis is that of security since it occupies such a prominent position in the 
empirical material. However, many traditional approaches to International Relations would not buy 
the claim that security can be treated in ideational terms in the first place. Thus it is necessary to 
explain this  argument  as well.  The justification for studying security as an ideational construct 
comes from the work of critical security theories. The general claim of those theories is to underline 
the contextuality of the use of security rhetoric. By defining security a socio-spatial consciousness 
(Laitinen 2003), the post-positivist security theories underline the malleability of the concept. In 
this  understanding,  security  does  not  have  an  essential  meaning  but  its  meaning  is  always 
constructed and it can thus only be understood in the specific context in which it has been used. The 
Copenhagen School of International Relations has systematized this contention by formulating the 
so called securitization approach. Securitization refers to a process through which an issue is lifted 
from the realm of normal politics and described as having absolute priority over other issues. This 
process happens not because of a real existential threat but because a certain issue is successfully 
presented and named as such by a relevant actor (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). In other words, security is 
a specific way of framing a particular issue (Waever 1996: 106). Accordingly, the actor(s) who have 
the capability to elevate an issue to the level of security hold significant power over other actors 
who do not have this capability. Identifying those actors can help to understand power structures 
both in domestic as well as in inter-state relations. By extension, the use of security discourse can 
thus also serve as an indicator of the ways in which powerful actors perceive their situation in 
relation to their environment. It is indeed this aspect of security that is most interesting for the 
purposes of this research. However, it is not the aim of this paper to theorise on the concept of 
security as such but rather ponder on the implications the use of such term24.
Waever  (1996)  shows  that  the  conventional  approach  to  security  always  defines  an 
24 Actually, I do not entirely agree on many aspects of the securitization approach. I especially reject its tendency of 
portraying security mainly as a tool for repression and the ensuing emancipatory agenda. In contrast, I prefer a more 
neutral approach to security as a simple signifier whose meaning has to be analysed in the context in which it 
occurs. I believe that the self-referential aspect of the use of security can actually be stronger than the negation of 
the other and that the use of the term can reveal important aspects of its users' identification. 
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"objective" reference object to which the use of security refers. For example, if the state is taken as 
the referent object, the survival of the state (i.e. its sovereignty) becomes the prime security issue. In 
the case of an individual, his own survival constitutes the reference against which different threats 
can be measured. Trying to establish an objective reference object against which different threats 
can be assessed limits, however, the applicability of the concept. For this reason Waever proposes to 
detach security from a stable reference object (state, nation or individual) and instead view it as a 
self-referential practice (Waever 1996: 106). What this means is that security does not acquire its 
meaning in reference to an real-world object, but that the linguistic use of the term alone constitutes 
the content of security. Thus while not intrinsically attached to a specific referent object, the use of 
the term security can serve as a cue for understanding and analysing the actor that has used it. This 
point of view can be summarised in the formula: "tell me what you fear and I'll tell you who you 
are". In other words, the security discourse of an actor can be used to understand and define its 
identity. As explained by Waever, finding out who or what is constituted as the reference of the 
European Union's security discourse will not only tell something about European security, "but also 
about what Europe is politically" (ibid: 110, emphasis in original).
The neighbourhood discourse and the EU's identity construction
To analyse the contents of the empirical material presented in the first part, I have thus opted to 
combine  insights  from  both  discursive  institutionalist  theory  and  critical  security  approaches. 
Following the discursive institutionalist theory this work understands institutions (including the EU) 
first and foremost as constructs built from the ideas held by the actors that make up the institutions. 
The theory also maintains that the analysis of discourses is the best way of finding out which ideas 
are central to a specific institution.  Needles to say,  discourses can be detected in many various 
forms,  policy documents  being  one of  the  most  central  sources.  Others  may include  speeches, 
internal briefings, interviews or other instances in which people representing the institution express 
ideas concerning its workings. In this paper, attention is limited to official published documents of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy. The analysis of the material presented in part one proceeds in 
two steps. Firstly, I will establish whether or not there are grounds to claim that the EU presents 
itself  as  an  independent  political  community.  This  analysis  is  based  on  the  theoretical  claims 
outlined above concerning the role of discourses in the construction of a political entity. Secondly, 
the paper will reflect on the question what type of political community does the EU seem to be in 
light of the neighbourhood discourse. Arguments about identity-building will guide this part of the 
analysis.
In the first  instance,  I will  analyse what the neighbourhood discourse can tell  about the 
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nature of  the  EU as  a  political  entity.  My main claim is  that  the EU purposefully attempts  to 
construct  an  image  of  itself  through  which  it  would  appear  as  a  strong  and  unified  political 
community. The first evidence that can be advanced to support this claim is the sheer existence of 
the neighbourhood policy in the present form. Although created at  the request of the European 
Council, the Commission has played a central role in the development and steering of the policy. 
The  policy has  to  a  large  extent  been  formulated in  Brussels  in  cooperation  with the  different 
institutions and it has proved flexible enough to incorporate a growing number of issues as they 
have gained importance on the Union's agenda (e.g. external security and the expansion of the area 
of freedom, security and justice). It is also noteworthy that the Commission has even resisted letting 
go of the ENP during the institutional changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon. There is thus reason 
to affirm, that the policy represents indeed a "community" vision of foreign policy and differs from 
the Union's general approach in this field which is usually much more controlled by the member 
states. In effect, the EU's efforts at cross-pillarization (i.e. in bringing policies of the three former 
pillars closer to each other) have even been seen as deliberate efforts in developing more coherent 
external action (Cremona and Hillion 2006). In addition, none of the present member states even 
has any similar policy initiatives thus making the ENP an original creation of the EU. Other more 
detailed aspects of the discourse present in the ENP documents can further strengthen the claim of 
ENP being a way for the EU to construct itself as a unified political community.
As  observed  above  (p.  6),  concerns  about  the  EU's  capability  of  action  in  the  post-
enlargement  neighbourhood  were  not  significantly  developed  until  the  conclusion  of  the 
enlargement  negotiations  in 2002. At  that  time the existence of  the neighbourhood was simply 
asserted but the Union did not yet show interest in developing its actorness in relation to this region. 
The first real step in that direction comes when the Commission and the High Representative are 
tasked to draft a plan on how to deal with the new neighbourhood by the Copenhagen European 
Council  in  2002.  Already  the  first  official  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  document,  the 
Commission's plan for Wider Europe A Neighbourhood gives insights of the way the EU sees itself 
vis-à-vis  the  neighbours.  From  the  very  beginning,  the  document  shows  a  very  EU-centred 
discourse that clearly portrays the interests of the Union. The foundation of the policy is the EU's 
will to satisfy what it perceives to be the demands of its citizens: "Over the coming decade and 
beyond,  the  Union's  capacity  to  provide  security,  stability  and  sustainable  development  to  its 
citizens will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours." 
(COM 2003a: 3). The interesting phenomenon here is that the EU positions itself as being directly 
responsible to its citizens in this new policy field that has been delegated to it by the member states. 
It  shows itself  as empowered by the citizens and supposedly also directly accountable to them, 
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which of course in the present institutional set up is not the case. By making this claim the EU 
clearly shows its strife to appear as an independent political actor in a way a traditional international 
organization could never be. An interesting question is whether this move was anticipated by the 
member  states  that  commissioned  the  policy  document  or  whether  the  "Brussels  bureaucracy" 
expressly overtook the agents  who officially hold exclusive powers  in  the foreign policy field. 
Anyhow, from this departure point the EU goes about to give its own account of how it sees the 
neighbourhood and how, according to its view, the area should be addressed. Thus the document 
singles out issues which from the EU's perspective appear as either challenges or opportunities. The 
Union does  not  hesitate  to  portray itself  as  the actor  that  has  the  best  capability to  tackle  the 
challenges  giving  little  or  no  account  for  the  partner  countries'  actions:  "The  EU  must  act to 
promote the regional and subregional cooperation and integration" (ibid. emphasis added). 
The EU's answer to the challenges posed by the neighbourhood are twofold: it relies firstly 
on the advancement of market integration and secondly on the security vision of the Union's justice 
and home affairs policies (p. 7 above). This feature provides additional ground for the argument 
according to which the EU wants to show itself to be an independent political actor. Both of the 
methods that have been chosen to address the neighbourhood can be characterised as being typical 
of the EU. Indeed, the faith in liberal market economy as a means to manage inter-state relations is 
synonymous with  the  whole  European integration  project.  The  fact  that  the  EU resorts  to  this 
approach also in its external relations indicates that it  has become so deeply internalized that it 
forms a part of who the EU is not just what it does. However, the same cannot be said about the 
internal  security agenda formulated  through the  justice  and home affairs  policies.  Actually,  the 
whole policy area of justice and home affairs policies (JHA) was first spelled out in the Maastricht 
Treaty that established the European Union in 1993 (Hix 2005: 347). The project of building an area 
of freedom, security and justice is even more recent since it was first formulated by the Tampere 
European Council in 1999. It is thus only recently that the EU has started to portray itself as a 
guarantor of its  citizens security,  one of the central  features of a nation state.  Moreover,  it  has 
proven difficult to the EU to gain legitimacy over an area so strongly associated with state authority 
and its whose policies in the field have been harshly criticised (see e.g.  Anderson and Apap 2002, 
Guild and Carrera 2006). It seems thus that Union may have taken the neighbourhood policy as an 
opportunity to assert its right to establish and develop this field. This view becomes increasingly 
plausible in the light of subsequent ENP documents.
Before analysing more closely what the extension of the JHA discourse to the field of the 
neighbourhood policy can tell about the aims and ambitions of the EU, I'll first focus on the ways in 
which external security is linked to ENP discourse. As noticed in the empirical chapter, the notion 
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of security enters the EU rhetoric with force with the introduction of the European Security Strategy 
in 2003. In addition to formulating a general strategy for the Union's dealings with third countries 
and the threats they may pose, the strategy puts specific emphasis on the role of the neighbourhood.
Indeed,  the  document  proclaims  that  "building  security  in  our  neighbourhood"  is  one  of  three 
strategic  objectives  for  the EU. It  puts  particular  emphasis  on the geographic proximity of the 
neighbourhood by expressing the idea that while the security issues arising in this area are global 
and not specific to this region, their potential effects on the EU are greater because of the proximity. 
The strategy suggests that the most imminent threat from the neighbourhood would come from the 
possibility of internal and inter-state conflicts that could spill over into the Union. Thus the Union 
clearly sees the proper management of the neighbourhood relations as essential to the preservation 
of its security. However, the strategy does not confine itself to the description of potential threats to 
the Union's security nor does it suggest the delegation of responsibility in this area to any other 
actor (i.e. the member states). To the contrary, the EU presents itself as being alone responsible for 
the peace and security of its citizens thus promoting a vision of it being a leading power in the 
region and a full-fledged political community. The strategy does not present security as a sum of the 
member states' separate security concerns but as surpassing them and necessitating joint action that 
only the EU can deliver25. The fact that the Union has had until now only minimal experience in 
providing security with military means does not seem to bother the drafters of the strategy. Indeed, 
the Union shows pride in pioneering the non-military security tools which, for better of for worse, 
have become its trademark. It seems thus that the Union has actually deeply internalized what has 
been characterised as the "soft security method" to the extent that it is ready to adopt that approach 
as a general guideline for its external action. Addressing the neighbours through this framework is 
thus not at all a failure for the Union although some other political actors may have been expected 
to deliver something more tangible also in the field of military defence. The EU, however, seems 
proud to  showcase  its  self-assurance  by embracing  a  unique  approach.  All  these  features  give 
increasing  weight  to  the  argument  that  the  EU  attempts  to  construct  itself  as  an  independent 
political actor.
The empirical material has made it clear that with each new document  the neighbourhood 
policy has  become increasingly rooted in  the Union's  security discourse,  both  the external  one 
embodied by the European Security Strategy as well as the internal one stemming from the project 
25 It is however noteworthy that the reference object in the European Security Strategy is "Europe" and not the citizens 
as in the case of the majority of ENP documents. The document speaks of European interests and problems faced by 
Europe and when explaining the objectives of the strategy: "It is in the European interest that countries on our 
borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in a violent conflict, weak states where organised crime 
flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth all pose problems for Europe" (European Council 
2003b: 7).
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for the area of freedom, security and justice26. However the use of the term security can be slightly 
confusing in this context since the EU is not very explicit when distinguishing between "external" 
and "internal" security. As a matter of fact, critical security scholars analysing EU security policies 
have negated that differentiation from the outset (Wolf et al. 2009). Nonetheless, this paper tries to 
follow the internal logic of argumentation of the EU. Thus it observes both lines of argumentation 
and their implications separately.  It is especially with the European Commission's Strategy Paper 
for the European Neighbourhood Policy (April  2004) that  the Union makes a decisive move in 
incorporating the ENP in the agenda of the internal security policies. In essence, that document 
shows the Union's goal to extend to the neighbours the security agenda that until now had been 
conceptualized in terms of intra-EU relations. The principal objectives of the policy had been from 
the outset to improve the security, the rights and the free movement of people within the European 
Union. Only five years after  its launch (in 1999) did the EU start  to also consider the external 
environment as a potential threat for its internal security goals. That concern is particularly clearly 
outlined in the 2005  Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice that places the neighbourhood policy among the top three policy instruments through which 
it  aims to address the threats.  The emergence of an external dimension to EU internal security 
cooperation has been characterised as being part of a post-cold war trend whereby the Union has 
gradually extended its policies to associated non-member states (Lavenex and Wichmann 2009: 83-
84). What is interesting, however, is that the first concrete and comprehensive document spelling 
out this policy is published at a time when the development of the neighbourhood policy is the most 
intense.  This move can for its part reinforce the argument about the Union's attempt to position 
itself as a distinct political actor. By treating external and internal security concerns simultaneously, 
the EU wants to show its capacity to coordinate issues across various policy fields, not a feature for 
which it has customarily been known for. 
Moreover, the externalization of internal security objectives also gives a power advantage to 
the EU vis-à-vis the partner countries. The principles, the objectives and the measures concerning 
the area of freedom, security and justice are formulated in a strictly "domestic" decision-making 
process from which the outside partners are absent. When those policies are then extended to the 
partner countries through the neighbourhood policy which, in principle is based on reciprocity, the 
partner countries have  de facto very little say since the content of the policies have already been 
formulated by the EU. In other words, the measures embedded in the ENP policies require other 
countries to conform to the Union's own practices for example in matters of judicial  and penal 
26 Although this review focuses on the documents setting the general parameters of the neighbourhood policy, Hillion 
notes that both the common foreign and security dimension as well as the justice and home affairs dimension have 
also been developed and strengthened in the country-specific Action Plans (2005: 18).
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reform, sharing police information and border controls and the trafficking of people. This practice 
actually amounts in purposeful efforts of influence by the EU (Haukkala 2003, Rees 2008). In the 
context of international relations this kind of practice could easily be seen as an infringement upon 
the partner countries' sovereignty. Interestingly, in the case of the EU's relations with neighbours 
such objections have not been heard.
The  analysis  has  by  now  shown  that  the  ENP discourse  contains  elements  that  quite 
convincingly  support  the  argument  made  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  i.e.  that  the  EU 
purposefully attempts to construct an image of itself through which it would appear as a strong and 
unified political community. Security has obviously played a role since the project that started off as 
an initiative for "building a ring of friends" (COM 2003a: 4) turned into a "security and prosperity 
policy for Europe's citizens" (Council of the European Union 2007: 3) in a matter of four years. The 
question is, however, what can this discourse tell more precisely about the EU. The existence of a 
constructed identity being  established,  follow-up question arises  concerning the content  of  that 
constructed identity. The second part of this chapter will thus focus on the question: what type of 
polity does the EU appear to be in the light of the ENP discourse? 
The concept of identity is not heavily theorised in this paper. In fact it is simply understood 
as a narrative,  a developing story that has been created with the help of a coherent conceptual 
apparatus (Stråth 2002). It is thus the story that an actor, in this case the European Union, tells about 
itself.  This  conceptualization  of  identity  actually  comes  very close  to  the  definition  discursive 
institutionalism gives about institutions. Since that theory sees institutions as structures of meaning 
internal to agents and since Stråth, on the other hand, conceptualizes identities as narratives held by 
actors then, it seems that the two can actually be equated. An institution is thus equal to its identity: 
the narrative it chooses to tell about itself. Of course such a story is rarely told explicitly. For this 
reason, any direct statements such as official documents can provide important information about 
the  actor.  Institutions,  however,  rarely  describe  their  perceptions  of  identity  in  an  open  self-
reflective manner27. For that reason, all the official discourse that publicly communicates the views 
of the actor have to be approached cautiously since it can only give clues for understanding the 
identity not a direct description. 
The first thing that can be said about the type of identity which emerges through the ENP 
discourse is that it is based on fear. Security, in its different manifestations is at the origin of much 
of the discourse. The source of the fear does not, however, appear to be the neighbours themselves. 
The documents do not at any occasion present the neighbours as being  threatening per se. They do 
27 The only occurrence when the EU has openly reflected on its identity was with the "Declaration on European 
Identity" given at the Copenhagen European Summit in December 1973 (European Summit 1973).
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not conceptualize the neighbours as opposing the EU or as having competing objectives. To the 
contrary, the documents actually present the neighbours as partners and sharing both the values and 
the concerns of the EU. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine that any of the neighbours (perhaps 
with the exception of the authoritarian Bielorus) could pose a direct military threat to the European 
Union (Aliboni 2005). By contrast,  the type of threat that emanates from the neighbours comes 
from their weak state structure and the potential instability they can transmit to the Union. The 
Union portrays them as possible and even probable vehicles of negative externalities that can take 
the form of for example uncontrolled and/or illegal immigration, disease and organized crime. The 
neighbours are thus threatening because of their weakness and their inability to serve as effective 
buffer  zone.  In  this  sense  the  neighbourhood  appears  more  as  being  instrumental  for  the 
preservation of EU security rather than a source of immanent threat.
The issues that most seem to dominate the ENP agenda, particularly since 2004-2005, are 
actually formulated under the Justice and Home Affairs agenda. What seems most threatening to the 
EU and what, in effect, justifies the whole policy is that the neighbours may transmit things that 
carry a negative impact on the Union's  citizens.  Citizens thus become the more or less explicit 
referent objects of the discourse28. Problems caused by the stark differences in living standards at 
the two sides of the EU border do not threaten the sovereignty of the Union which rests in the hands 
of  the  member  states.  The  Union  would  not  cease  to  exists  even  if  immigration  increased, 
environment was damaged or organized crime gained more ground within its borders. However, the 
increase of the potential threats enumerated in the ENP documents could certainly play a role in the 
mood of EU citizens. Dissatisfaction, although generally first manifest at the national level could 
easily spread to the EU level. The dramatic results of the 2005 constitutional referenda indicate for 
their part that citizen dissatisfaction can be damaging to the EU (Milner 2006). It seems thus that 
although it is not officially directly accountable to its citizens, the EU, through the creation of a 
policy aiming to protect their interests, tries to position itself as their champion.
It is interesting to discover that the neighbourhood discourse actually reveals a Union for 
which societal  concerns  weigh more than geopolitical  or  strategic  ones.  Had the Union argued 
forcefully against the neighbours as rival or threatening polities, its image would have appeared as 
that  of  a  state  apprehensive  about  its  own  survival.  An  explicit  exclusion  of  the  "other"  on 
nationalistic grounds would have meant that the EU still subscribes to a traditional spatial view of 
political identity that underlines the importance of territorial integrity (Jukarainen 1999: 57). This is 
not to say, that the EU does not perform any sort of othering. Quite to the contrary, the material 
28 The documents speak variably about "citizens", "us" or "Europe" as the ones having an interest in the type of policy 
they advocate.
27
shows a Union that is very apprehensive about the negative effects the neighbours could bring to its 
internal stability. Thus the Union's identity construction, the narrative it tells about itself, is heavily 
based on the perception of a threat coming from an outside source. From this standpoint the Union's 
identity-building process does actually follow a traditional pattern of distinguishing oneself from a 
threatening outside world (Delanty 1995, Neumann 1999). Crucially, however, the things that the 
EU sees as being the most threatening to its stability do not target its political or military machinery 
but its social structures. The fact that the Union places the citizens and the society as the referent 
object of its security discourse can be taken as a strong evidence for it  wanting to appear as a 
societal political community.
Conclusion
The European Neighbourhood Policy has been the first attempt by the EU to extend its governance 
to countries outside its immediate borders while explicitly excluding them from the possibility of 
membership.  The  result  has  been  a  discourse  that  on  the  one  hand  has  asserted  the  common 
objectives and the similarity of value-basis both in the EU and the neighbours but which, on the 
other  hand,  has  relied  heavily on security as  the  legitimate  basis  for  the  policy.  This  apparent 
discrepancy becomes more understandable when it is realized that the ENP, rather than being a 
genuine foreign policy, is actually an extension of the EU's domestic policy concerns. As shown 
throughout the paper, the neighbourhood countries were actually only instrumental to the security 
concerns motivating the EU rhetoric. In fact, the origin of those fears is not external to the Union 
but internal. Domestic instability that could be caused by external triggers seem to be the main 
motivating factor of the whole policy.
This paper has studied documents related to the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy 
and, based on that study, it has advanced a claim that the EU can be characterised as a political 
community conscious of its societal dimension. Obviously, complex institutional structures such as 
the EU never construct their identity from a single source but base them on a variety of contrasting 
and some times contradicting ideas. The decision to study security related perceptions in the ENP 
documents is however justified for two distinct reasons. Firstly, as showed by the empirical part, 
that discourse was strongly present in the documents. Indeed, the analysis of the paper covered the 
entirety of the general policy documents produced by the Union in relation to this policy field as 
well as documents in the field of Justice and Home Affairs which had a direct link with the external 
policies of the Union. Secondly, the interest in security rhetoric can be justified from and identity-
building perspective. As pointed out by Campbell (1992), a policy that warns of threats is central in 
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constituting an identity (via Waever 1996). What is interesting in the case of the ENP and what was 
revealed through a close analysis of the discourse was that, contrary to expectations, the security 
rhetoric was not directly directed against the neighbours.
The method selected in this paper thus proved its usefulness. The paper had chosen to focus 
on discourses because it believed that their analysis gives the best result when trying to figure out 
the cognitive structures that make up individual and collective identities (Appleby et al. 1994: 4-
11). After discovering that the neighbours per se were not the source of threat in the eyes of the EU, 
the next step for the paper was to find out who or what were its sources. By extension this meant 
pondering  on the  question  of  what  kind of  identity  was  the  EU constructing  with  the  security 
discourse observed in the neighbourhood documents. The answer could have been sought in the IR 
theories on security communities. However Adler and Barnett's definition of a security community 
as being a community whose members entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change (1998: 
34)  was  not  suitable  to  describe  the  situation  at  hand  between  the  EU  and  the  neighbouring 
countries. As stated on several occasions and despite its external  appearance, the neighbourhood 
policy is actually less about the neighbouring countries than it is about the EU. In the light of the 
documents, the EU looks like an actor that wants to be able to control developments to its internal 
security also by means of external policy. For that reason stabilizing the neighbouring area is of 
utmost importance. The Union does not, however, aim at creating a security community together 
with those countries as was the case in the Eastern enlargement. Instead, it seems that the logic of 
the security community is confined to the EU borders and that outside of those borders the normal 
rules  of  international  relations  apply.  Nonetheless,  the  EU,  apparently  still  apprehensive  of  its 
internal security or at least too cautious to risk damaging it with negative externalities coming from 
the neighbours,  makes  significant efforts to try to extend its  influence beyond the borders. The 
rationale for this kind of action is found in the Union's internal identification as being a political 
community with societal accountability. 
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